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NOTES
DIRECTOR'S STATUTORY ACTION IN NEW YORK
I
INTRODUCTION
The power and duty of managing the ordinary business of a corporation
are vested in the board of directors I who are fiduciaries of the corporation.
The standard of care which the directors are required to exercise in super-
vising corporation affairs is the degree of care and skill which an ordinarily
prudent director of a similar corporation would use in the same circum-
stances.3 For more than a century shareholders have used the derivative
suit to hold directors accountable for any losses arising from breach of
their fiduciary duty or failure to exercise due care.4 New York, by statute,
also permits a director to maintain an action for directors' or officers' acts of
misconduct.5
1. 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 431 (1959); Lattin, Corporations
211 (1959). M any states have statutes providing that the corporate business ALM be
managed by the board of directors. Lattin, supra at 214. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Corp.
Law § 27 (Supp. 1960).
2. E.g, Cohen v. Cocoline Prods. Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127 N.E.2d 906 (1955); Sialkot
Importing Corp. v. Berlin, 295 N.Y. 482, 68 N.E.2d 501 (1946); Bloom v. National
United Benefit Say. & Loan Co., 152 N.Y. 114, 46 N.E. 166 (1897).
3. This standard was formulated in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891), in
which the Supreme Court stated that the requisite degree of care is "that which
ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under sinilar circumstances, and in
determining [the degree of care] ... usages of business should be taken into account."
Id. at 152. Professor Lattin states that the Briggs standard is the common expression
for the duty of care required of directors. Lattin, supra note 1, at 241. Professor
Hornstein, on the other hand, says that the prevailing standard is that of New York,
i.e., the degree of care which ordinarily prudent men, acting in their own self-interest,
would use in conducting their own affairs. 1 Hornstein, supra note 1, § 446. For an
application of the New York standard, see Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
4. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1832); Taylor v. Miami Exporting
Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831); Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co., 11 Sim. 327, 59 Eng. Rep.
900 (Ch. 1840).
5. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60 (1943), § 61 (Supp. 1960). Section 60 reads as
follows:
"An action may be brought against one or more of the directors or officers of a
corporation to procure judgment for the following relief or any part thereof:
1. To compel the defendants to account for their official conduct, including any
neglect of or failure to perform their duties, in the management and dispoasition of the
funds and property, committed to their charge.
2. To compel them to pay to the corporation, or to its creditors, any money and
the value of any property, which they have acquired to themselves, or transferred to
others, or lost, or wasted, by or through any neglect of or failure to perform or other
violation of their duties.
3. To suspend a defendant from exercising his office, for an abuse of his trust.
4. To remove a defendant from office and to direct the filling of the vacancy in
accordance with the charter and by-laws of the corporation, or, if they contain no
provision therefor, in such manner as the court shall direct.
S. To set aside a transfer of property, made by one or more directors or officers
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The purpose of this Note is to (1) set forth and analyze the existing
law on the director's statutory action, (2) show how it differs from the share-
holders' derivative suit, (3) analyze the effect of the director's suit on the
current problem of when a president of a corporation has implied authority
to institute suit in the name of the corporation, and (4) point out the
advantages which the director's action has over that of the shareholder.
II
THEORY OF SHAREHOLDERS' AND DIRECToR's ACTIONS
Shareholders' Derivative Action.-The shareholders' derivative suit was
developed in equity to provide a means of correcting abuses by corporate
management without a multiplicity of suits.0 When the corporation is in-
jured by the directors' negligence or breach of duty, a corporate cause of
of a corporation, contrary to provision of law, where the tranferee knew the purpose of
the transfer.
6. To enjoin such a transfer where there is good reason to apprehend that It will
be made."
The appointment of a receiver of the corporation's property can also be granted
as part of the relief. The supreme court has inherent power to appoint a receiver of
the property of a corporation. Popper v. Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen
Friends, 61 App. Div. 405, 70 N.Y. Supp. 637 (2d Dep't 1901). This type of relief
was granted in Miller v. Barlow, 78 App. Div. 331, 79 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1st Dep't 1903).
Section 61 provides in part: "An action may be brought for the relief prescribed
in section sixty of this chapter, by the attorney-general in behalf of the people of the
state, or except for the relief specified in the third and fourth subdivisions of said section
by the corporation or a creditor, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy thereof, or by a
director or officer of the corporation."
Sections 60-61 do not apply "to a religious corporation; to a municipal or public
benefit corporation, created by the constitution or by or under the laws of this state;
nor . . . to any corporation which the regents of the university have power to dissolve,
except in aid of its liquidation under such dissolution, upon the application of the
regents, or of the trustees of such a corporation." N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 130 (1943).
In New York, the director's action was first authorized in 1828. N.Y. Sss. Laws
1828, ch. 20, § 3 [codified in 2 Rev. Stat. pt. 3, ch. 8, tit. 4, §§ 33, 35 (1828)]. For
a time the authorization was codified as N.Y. Code Civ. Proced. §§ 1781-82 (Banks &
Bros. 1880). The predecessor sections of the current sections 60-61 were codified as
N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 90-91 (1917). N.Y. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 28. The old § 91
differed from § 61 in providing that the action could be maintained by an "officer . . .
having a general superintendence of its concerns." Consequently, under § 91, tho
treasurer of a corporation could not maintain a suit since he was not an officer having
general superintendence of its concerns. Loughlin v. Wocker, 152 App. Div. 466, 137
N.Y. Supp. 257 (2d Dep't 1912). Since this qualification does not appear in § 61, a
treasurer is now allowed to bring suit. Peets v. Manhasset Civil Eng'rs, Inc., 68
N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1946). For general legislative history, see People v. Lowe, 117
N.Y. 175, 22 N.E. 1016 (1889); People v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United
States, 124 App. Div. 714, 109 N.Y. Supp. 453 (1908).
Michigan is the only other state found to have legislation similar to New York's.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.47 (1948). Alaska had a statute, Alaska Sess. Laws 1931, ch.
8, § 19, similar to New York's. It was repealed, however, in 1957. Alaska Sesm. Laws
1957, ch. 126, § 156.
6. See Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N.Y. 52 (1882); Prunty, The Shareholders'
Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 980 (1957).
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action arises.7 Historically, when a shareholder sued management to enforce
the corporate cause of action, he did not pursue the corporate right to insti-
tute suit. Rather he exercised an equitable right belonging to the share-
holders to enforce a duty owed them by the directors as a consequence of
the power vested in the board.8 The modern theory is that the shareholders'
suit for acts of managerial abuse is "secondary" or "derivative, '* the
primary right to bring suit belonging to the corporation.10 A shareholder is
permitted to enforce the cause of action only because he has a proprietary
interest in the corporation," the value of which has declined as a result
of the mismanagement.1 Since the shareholder in instituting suit has no
duty to other shareholders, his relation to them is merely that of a volun-
teer.
13
These three characteristics of a derivative suit, (1) the secondary
7. Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 179 N.E. 487 (1932); Greaves v. Gouge, 69 N.Y.
154 (1877); IV. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 186 Misc. 758, 61
N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1945), affd mem., 270 App. Div. 912, 61 N.Y.S2d 882 (2d
Dep't 1946); Coronado Dev. Corp. v. Milikin, 175 Misc. 1, 22 N.Y.S.d 670 (Sup. Ct
1940).
8. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1832); Taylor v. Miami Exporting
Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831); Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. R. 371,
389-90 (N.Y. 1817) (dictum); Prunty, supra note 6, at 989, 994.
9. The "derivative" or "secondary" nature arose when the shareholders successfully
extended their right to extracorporate defendants since such third parties are obligated
only to the corporation and not to the shareholders. Prunty, supra note 6, at 989-92,
994. The demand requirement resulted from the recognition that the shareholders' rights
were derivative. Prunty, supra note 6, at 991. Prior to 1840, the cases involving an
action by a shareholder for managerial abuse did not require an allegation of demand
nor did the complaints contain one. Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co, supra note 8;
Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co., 11 Sim. 327, 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Ch. 1840). See
Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., supra note 8, at 389-90. Cf. Wells v. Jewett, 11
How. Pr. 242, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855); Robinson v. Smith, supra note 8, at 232-33.
One of the earliest cases requiring a demand upon the board of directors was Vanderbilt
v. Garrison, 3 Abb. Pr. 361 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1856). The case dealt with emtracorporate
defendants.
10. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 186 Misc. 758, 61 N.YS.2d
876 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270 App. Div. 912, 61 N.YS.2d 882 (2d Dep't 1946);
Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 264, 179 N.E. 487, 489 (1932) (dictum).
11. "This right arises out of the interest the stockholders have in the preservation
of the corporate property and the trust relation of the directors to them." Bloom v.
National United Benefit Say. & Loan Co., 81 Hun 120, 123, 30 N.Y. Supp. 700, 702 (Sup.
CL 1894), affd, 152 N.Y. 114, 46 N.E. 166 (1897). On appeal, the court in the Bloom
case rejected the idea that directors are trustees of the shareholders. 152 N.Y. at 120,
46 N.E. at 167.
12. To protect the rights of creditors and avoid a multiplicity of suits, recoveries
by individual shareholders are not allowed. Recoveries go to the corporation. Niles v.
New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 176 N.Y. 119, 68 N.E. 142 (1903); Ballantine, Corpora-
tions § 143 (rev. ed. 1946). Tax considerations have also been dted as supporting
recovery by the corporation rather than by stockholders. Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
432, 441 (NJ). Iowa 1946).
13. Williams v. Robinson, 9 Misc. 2d 774, 775, 169 N.Y.S2d 811, 813 (Sup. Ct.
1957) (dictum), aff'd mem. sub nom. Levy v. Whipple, 5 App. Div. 2d 823, 170 N.YS.2d
991 (1st Dep't 1958).
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nature of the right, (2) the protection of a proprietary interest and (3) the
volunteer status of the shareholder, account for the differences between actions
for managerial abuse brought by shareholders and those instituted by
directors.
Director's Statutory Action-Section 61 of the New York General
Corporation Law expressly authorizes a director to institute an action to
redress corporate wrongs caused by acts of misconduct of other directors
or officers.14 Thus, the right is "original" and not "secondary" or "deriva-
tive" and the action should properly be called a director's statutory action.
In pursuing his right under section 61, a director is not a volunteer. He is
fulfilling his "stewardship obligation" to the corporation and the share-
holders.' , In fact, it has been said that another reason for giving the direc-
tor this right was to "protect him from possible liability for failure to pro-
ceed against those responsible for improper management of the corporate
affairs."' 6 Thus, the basis of the director's suit is not any proprietary
interest. 7 Absent the statute, a director could not bring suit to recover for
a corporate wrong in his capacity as director.18 Apparently, the reason
would be that an action by an individual director would violate Section 27
of the General Corporation Law, which provides that the affairs of the cor-
poration should be managed by the board.19
III
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
Demand.-The primary right to redress wrongs to the corporation be-
longs to the corporation and not to its shareholders.20 Therefore, a share-
14. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61 (Supp. 1960).
15. Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 211, 160 N.E.2d 463, 467, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158,
163 (1959).
16. Id. at 211, 160 N.E.2d at 467, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 163. This point is questionable.
Absent a statute the director would not be able to institute suit. The court, however,
may have assumed that prior to the statute a director's failure to Inform the stock-
holders of a wrong, although he did not participate in it, constituted a breach of duty
for which he could be held accountable. With the existence of a statute today, it Is
very likely that a director's failure to institute suit, when there is reason to belleve
that a wrong has been committed, would constitute a breach of duty. For language
indicating this, see Cohen v. Cocoline Prods., Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 124, 127 N.E.2d 906,
908 (1955); Schoenherr v. Van Meter, 215 N.Y. 548, 552, 109 N.E. 625, 626 (1915)
(semble). This rule would enable a wrong to be redressed if the statute of limitations
had run against the wrongdoers but not against the director who later discovered the
wrong and failed to take action.
17. In New York, a director may be relieved of the necessity for proprietary In-
terest by the certificate of incorporation or by-laws. N.Y. Stock Corp, Law § 55 (1951).
That most states do not require that a director be a shareholder, see Lattin, supra note
1, at 212.
18. See Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 211, 160 N.E.2d 463, 467, 189 N.Y.S,2d
158, 163 (1959).
19. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 27 (Supp. 1960).
20. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 186 Misc. 758, 61
N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270 App. Div. 912, 61 N.Y.S.2d 882 (2d
Dep't 1946); Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 264, 179 N.E. 487, 489 (1932) (dictum).
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holder must establish his right to sue either by alleging that he made a
demand and refusal on the directors who wrongfully refused to take action
or by setting forth facts which show that such a demand would have been
futile.21 A demand and refusal are not required as a condition precedent to
a director's action, since section 61 which expressly governs the action has
no such requirement.2
It is submitted that there should be a demand requirement for director's
actions in order to give greater effect to section 27 which provides that
corporate affairs are to be managed by the board.p Actions by a single
director under section 61 would then be limited to situations in which the
board of directors abused their discretion by wrongfully refusing to sue.2 4
Contemporary Ownership Ru .- The plaintiff in a derivative action
must show that he was a stockholder at the time the alleged wrong was
committed25 or that his stock thereafter devolved upon him by operation of
law.28 The contemporary ownership requirement must also be satisfied as
a condition to intervention in such a suit.2 7 Complaint may be made of a
continuing wrong after acquisition of stock . 8 However, a complaint framed
in the present tense will not circumvent the rule if the allegations refer back
to the original wrong which occurred prior to plaintiff's ownership. -0 This
provision applies to any shareholders' action to assert the corporation's right
21. Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 11 NX.2d 883 (1937); Continental Sec.
Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). See discussion of the reason for the de-
mand requirement in note 9 supra. Demand on the shareholders is also necessary where
the act complained of is subject to ratification by the shareholders. Continental Sec.
Co. v. Belmont, supra.
22. Rabinowitz v. Schwartz (Sup. CL 1954), in 131 N.Y.LJ. No. 6, p. 10, col 5;
Katz v. Braz, 188 Misc. 581, 66 N.YS.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd mer., 69 N.YS.2d
324 (1st Dep't 1947); Miller v. Barlow, 78 App. Div. 331, 336, 79 N.Y. Supp. 964, 968
(1st Dep't 1903) (dictum).
23. Cf. West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 348, 160 NE.2d
622, 625, 189 N.Y.S2d 863, 866 (1959) (Froessel, J., dissenting). In light of the
majority's apparent disinclination to read § 27 strictly, however, it is doubtful that the
court of appeals would hold that demand in a director's action is necessary.
24. This statement presumes that the courts would treat the requirement of demand
on the board in a director's suit just as they do in a shareholders' action, i.e., by per-
mitting suit, absent a demand, upon a showing that demand would have been futile.
25. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61 (Supp. 1960). Before this statute was amended in
1944, no such rule existed in New York. See Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y.
7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). The provision is constitutional Coane v. American Distilling
Co., 298 N.Y. 197, 81 N.E.2d 87 (1948); Myer v. Myer, 296 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562
(1947) (mem.), affirming 271 App. Div. 465, 66 N.YS.2d 83 (1st Dep't 1946). The
stock must be owned at the commencement of the action, as well as at the time of
the wrong. Miller v. Miller, 256 App. Div. 846, 9 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't) (mem.),
aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 716, 21 N.E.2d 212 (1939).
26. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61 (Supp. 1960).
27. Richman v. Felmus, 8 App. Div. 2d 985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1959)(mer.).
28. York Properties, Inc. v. Neidoff, 10 Misc. 2d 439, 170 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct.
1957).
29. Weinstein v. Behn, 65 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd mem., 272 App. Div.
1045, 75 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Ist Dep't 1947).
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against any defendant and is not limited to an action brought under sec-
tion 60.30
There is no corresponding obstacle to the institution of a director's suit,
since the contemporary ownership rule applies only to a shareholders'
action.31 Thus, a director may sue for acts of misconduct which occurred
prior to his election and shareholders may avoid the effect of the rule if
they can obtain representation on the board of directors.
IV
PROPER PARTIES
Parties Plaintiff -A director of a corporation is expressly authorized
by statute to bring an action against one or more of the directors or officers
of the corporation for acts of misconduct.3 2 This right exists only if the
director is in office at the time the action is commenced.3 3 A director's ex-
press acceptance of his office is unnecessary to the action. Absent a statute
or controlling usage to the contrary, one who is elected a director is pre-
sumed to accept the office and, therefore, may maintain the action.34 He
remains qualified to do so, absent express acceptance, until he is removed
pursuant to the corporate by-laws or until such time elapses that he is
presumed to have declined the office.35
A director of a foreign corporation which transacts business and has its
principal office in New York, as well as a director of a domestic corporation,
can maintain an action.36 The New York Court of Appeals has stated that
to restrict the application of the statute to directors of domestic corporations
would not be in accord with the broad language 6f the statute.37 Moreover,
such a distinction would be arbitrary since many foreign corporations con-
duct almost all their business within this state. 88
30. Schwartz v. Kahn, 183 Misc. 252, 50 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
31. See N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61 (Supp 1960).
32. See N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60 (1943), § 61 (Supp. 1960).
33. Manix v. Fantl, 209 App. Div. 756, 205 N.Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1924); Roth-
bart v. Star Wet Wash Laundry Co., 185 App. Div. 807, 17 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't
1919).
34. Halpin v. Mutual Brewing Co., 20 App. Div. 583, 47 N.Y. Supp. 412 (1st Dep't
1897).
35. Ibid. Omission by a director elected in January to attend meetings between
January and April did not, as a matter of law, constitute such a long-continued neglect
of duty as to amount to an abandonment of office. Id. at 585, 47 N.Y. Supp. at 413-14.
36. Miller v. Quincy, 179 N.Y. 294, 72 N.E. 116 (1904). Accord, Acken v. Coughlin,
103 App. Div. 1, 92 N.Y. Supp. 700 (1st Dep't 1905). See Kebaya v. Axton, 32 F.
Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), in which the court assumed for the purposes of argument
that § 61 applied to foreign corporations without a place of business in New York,
provided that personal jurisdiction over the directors was obtained according to New
York practice. However, in Kehaya v. Axton, 30 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), juris-
diction was obtained by attaching defendants' property located in New York. There-
after, defendants made a general appearance.
37. Miller v. Quincy, supra note 36, at 299-300, 72 N.E. at 118.
38. Id. at 299-300, 72 N.E. at 117. Two consequences of a holding that the statuto
refers only to directors of a domestic corporation apparently influenced the court,
First, such a holding would logically compel a further holding that only creditors of
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The director's action under the statute is several and not joint.30 Thus,
a single director may prosecute the action without joining any of his co-
directors. 40 Neither is it necessary to join other persons named in section
61.- 1 It has been held that a general creditor is not a necessary party in a
director's action for an accounting because all the rights of the plaintiff-
director, the defendants and the corporation can be determined without join-
ing the general creditor.42 Although the benefits of a director's suit inure
to the corporation,43 it is not necessary to join the corporation as a party
plaintiff.44
Parties Defendant .The actual parties defendant in a director's statu-
tory action are the directors and officers together with other wrongdoers
against whom judgment is sought.45 The action may be maintained against
directors although they have ceased to hold office prior to the commencement
of suit 4 6 Thus, an action for an accounting and the cancellation of cor-
porate bonds and mortgages issued for the benefit of three former directors
could be maintained. In so holding, the court was influenced by the fact
that "the efficiency of the statute would be seriously impaired were it held
that the action could only be maintained against directors while in office." 4 7
The corporation is the formal or nominal defendant,48 but it is not
a domestic corporation are entitled to the benefits of § 61. Secondly, directors of a
foreign corporation would be able to mulct the corporation while New York courts
would be helpless to redress the wrongs. Ibid. The corporation, however, might be
adequately protected against this wrong by the shareholders' derivative action. An
action by the attorney general is not a satisfactory answer. The attorney general can
only bring an action when the public interest is involved. Swan v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n, 155 N.Y. 9, 49 N.E. 258 (1898); People v. Lowe, 117 N.Y. 175, 22
N.E. 1016 (1889).
39. "[Tihe same section that authorizes an action to be brought by the Attorney-
General on behalf of the People, authorizes it to be brought by one trustee or director
of the corporation. We think ... any one of the directors could bring this action.'
Gildersleeve v. Lester, 68 Hun 532, 534, 22 N.Y. Supp. 1026, 1027 (Sup. CL 1893).
See Miller v. Barlow, 78 App. Div. 331, 79 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1st Dep't 1903).
40. Gildersleeve v. Lester, supra note 39 (suit by one trustee).
41. See cases cited in note 39 supra.
42. Miller v. Barlow, 78 App. Div. 331, 79 N.Y. Supp. 964 (Ist Dep't 1903). The
court maintained that the director in bringing the action was a trustee for the creditor.
Since the creditor is a beneficiary, his rights are protected by the plaintiff-director who
acts in a representative capacity. Id. at 335-36, 79 N.Y. Supp. at 967.
43. Manix v. Fant, 209 App. Div. 7S6, 205 N.Y. Supp. 174 (Ist Dept 1924).
44. Miller v. Barlow, 78 App. Div. 331, 79 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1st Dep't 1903). "Nor
was it essential that the corporation should have been made a party plaintiff in the
action. In a sense the corporation is a party in default and guilty of dereliction of
duty, as it is represented by and acts through its directors and officers. The judgment
asks for the appointment of a receiver of its property. It was, therefore, properly made
a party defendant." Id. at 336, 79 N.Y. Supp. at 968.
45. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60 (1943).
46. Jacobus v. Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App. Div. 366, 88 N.Y. Supp. 302
(Ist Dep't 1904).
47. Id. at 379, 88 N.Y. Supp. at 311.
48. Kehaya v. Axton, 30 F. Supp. 838, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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always necessary to make it a party. In Green v. Compton," some of the
trustees of a corporation instituted an action against other trustees to re-
strain them from unlawfully transferring corporate property. The defendants
claimed that there was a defect in the parties, the corporation not having
been joined as a defendant. The court stated that this would be true if the
action were brought by a shareholder since his right arises only when the
management of a corporation wrongfully refuses to act after demand by the
stockholder. ° The director, however, has an original right of action under
the statute and, therefore, the corporation need not be joined."' In reaching
this decision, the court distinguished Miller v. Barlow,52 in which appoint-
ment of a receiver and restoration of misappropriated and wasted funds were
sought. Joining the corporation as a defendant in order to have it bound
by the judgment was the only way in which there could be a determination
of all the parties' rights in the controversy.53 In the Green case, the litiga-
tion could be completed and an injunction granted without joining the cor-
poration.5"
When an action is brought to set aside an unlawful transfer, the trans-
feree who conspired with the directors can be made a party. Section 60
authorizes the setting aside of transfers of property, and a transfer cannot
be set aside without making the transferee a party. Consequently, it would
unreasonably restrict the application of this provision to prohibit the joinder
of persons other than directors and officers of the corporation.
V
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
Coinplaint.-A director prosecuting an action under section 61 must
specifically allege that he was a director at the time of the commencement
of the action or he must allege facts which by necessary inference show him
49. 41 Misc. 21, 83 N.Y. Supp. 588 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
So. Id. at 25, 83 N.Y. Supp. at 590.
51. Ibid. Another reason advanced is that the plaintiff acts in a trust relation for
the benefit of the corporation. The court states, however, that the corporation Is a
necessary party in a shareholders' action. 41 Misc. at 25, 83 N.Y. Supp. at 590.
52. 78 App. Div. 331, 79 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1st Dep't 1903).
53. Id. at 336, 79 N.Y. Supp. at 968. Joinder of the corporation is needed to pre-
clude the possibility of a double recovery against the wrongdoers in a subsequent suit
by the corporation itself. Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige Ch 607 (N.Y. 1836) (share-
holders' derivative suit). Higgins v. Applebaum, 183 App. Div. 527, 170 N.Y. Supp,
228 (1st Dep't 1918), suggests that the corporation is joined only as a passive recipient
of any recovery, since there is no cause of action alleged against it. See also Prunty,
supra note 6, at 989.
54. The fear of a double recovery does not exist when an injunction alono Ig
demanded. It might be inquired whether the rule should be the sme in a share-
holders' derivative suit or whether the corporation should always be a necessary party
defendant.
55. Katz v. Braz, 188 Misc. 581, 66 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd mem.,
69 N.Y.S.2d 324 (lst Dep't 1947).
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to have been a director. 8 Failure to do so is a fatal defect. 7 The director,
however, need not state in the title of the action that he is suing in a
representative capacity.58 This contrasts with a shareholders' derivative
suit, in which the shareholder must allege that he is bringing the action on
behalf of himself and all other shareholders.50 To complete the complaint,
the director should set forth the existence of the corporation and the char-
acter of the defendants, together with facts which, if proved, would justify
the granting of the relief prescribed by section 60.00 In both director's0 '
and shareholders' suits, 62 the prayer for relief should ask for an award di-
rectly to the corporation.
Pre-Trial Examination.-A director is entitled to a pre-trial examination
of the defendants, even though he could obtain information by examination
of the corporate books. 63 An inspection of the books is no substitute for a
formal examination.
Jury Trial.-In a director's statutory action, either party is entitled as
a matter of right to demand a jury trial on the issues of negligence.04 These
issues must be framed pursuant to Section 429 of the Civil Practice Act.0
Under that section a party intending to exercise his statutory right to a
jury trial must secure a court order directing all issues of fact arising from
the alleged negligent act to be plainly and distinctly stated. The order
will include only those questions which a jury may properly determine.c
The jury does not render a verdict but merely answers the questions sub-
mitted in the order. Their answers are conclusive unless the verdict is
set aside or a new trial is granted. 6T
Summary Judgment.-Prior to the adoption of Rule 113 of the New
York Rules of Civil Practice, a summary judgment could not be granted in
an action brought under section 61 to compel a defendant to account for
56. Rothbart v. Star Wet Wash Laundry Co., 185 App. Div. 807, 174 N.Y. Supp.
76 (Ist Dep't 1919); Bellino v. Lerner (Sup. CL 1937), in 97 N.Y.L.J. 1342, coL 2.
57. Rothbart v. Star Wet Wash Laundry Co., supra note 56.
58. Higgins v. Applebaum, 183 App. Div. 527, 170 N.Y. Supp. 228 (1st Dep't 1918).
59. Bako Realty Inc. v. Hays, 153 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div.
2d 834, 163 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1st Dep't 1957); Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate
and Individual Grievances, 33 Yale L.J. 580 (1924).
60. See Green v. Compton, 41 Misc. 21, 25, 83 N.Y. Supp. 588, 590 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
61. Manix v. Fantl, 209 App. Div. 756, 205 N.Y. Supp. 174 (Ist Dep't 1924); N.Y.
Gen. Corp. Law § 60 (1943). That no cause of action under §§ 60-61 is stated when an
individual recovery is sought, see Spiegel v. Spiegel (Sup. Ct. 1950), in 123 N.Y.LJ.
1631, coL 5.
62. Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 179 N.E. 487 (1932). For the exceptions to this
rule, see Lattin, Corporations 378-80 (1959); Stevens, Corporations, 789.94 (2d ed.
1949).
63. Burgess v. Stevens, 148 Misc. 450, 266 N.Y. Supp. 79 (Sup. CL 1933).
64. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61 (Supp. 1960).
65. Ibid.
66. That a jury may not determine the amount of damages when impractical to do
so, see Momand v. Landers, 174 App. Div. 227, 160 N.Y. Supp. 1053 (1st Dep't 1916).
67. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 429. See Lubuk v. Lubuk, 181 Misc. 852, 42 N.YS.2d
594 (1943) (issue of adultery in divorce proceeding).
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mismanagement.08 That rule, however, allows summary judgment in any
action.69 Summary judgment should, therefore, be available in a director's
action.
VI
SECURITY FOR EXPENSES AND REIMBURSEMENT
If a plaintiff stockholder suing derivatively cannot show either that he
possesses at least 5% of the outstanding shares of any class of stock or
voting trust certificates or that his holdings have a market value in excess
of $50,000, the corporation is entitled at any stage in the proceedings
before final judgment to require the plaintiff to post security for expenses. 0
From the language of section 61-b it is clear that the impediment of posting
security for expenses does not apply to a director's action under section
61.71
A former New York statute provided, in part, for the reimbursement
by the corporation of the expenses of plaintiff-directors successfully prose-
cuting an action in its behalf."2 Although repealed73 this provision was
merely declaratory of the common law, 74 so that a successful plaintiff is
still entitled to reimbursement. 75 Since there has never been any provision
relating to unsuccessful plaintiff-directors, it could be inferred that an un-
successful director must bear the burden of the litigation expenses as is
the case in a shareholders' derivative suit.76 It is submitted that such a
result would place a conscientious director in a precarious position when
there is reason to believe that other officers or directors are guilty of mis-
conduct. If the director should prove to be unsuccessful, he would be re-
quired to pay for the expenses incurred. This possibility might deter him
from commencing the action. His failure to bring suit, on the other hand,
might constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty to the corporation. He
would thus be liable in a derivative suit by the stockholders. 7 Therefore,
68. Fisce~la v. Fridman, 169 Misc. 327, 7 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
69. N.Y.R. Civ. Prac. 113.
70. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b (Supp. 1960). Expenses include not only costs
and attorneys' fees which may be incurred by the corporation in connection with the
action, but also attorneys' fees which may be incurred by other party defendants who
may have a right to assess them against the corporation. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 64
(Supp. 1960).
71. de Capriles, Business Organization, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 613, 629 n.132, in 1959 Ann.
Survey Am. L. 316, 332 n.132 (1960); Prunty, Business Associations, 1958 Survey of
N.Y. Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1134 n.6. A director may be required in the court's
discretion to post security for costs. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1523.
72. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 350, § 1. See also Williams v. Fleming (Sup. Ct.
1943), in 109 N.Y.L.J. 385, col. S.
73. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 869, § 2.
74. N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report 161 (1945).
75. That the repeal of this provision was not intended to deprive successful plaintiffs
of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees, see N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 869, § 5.
76. Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 42 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Ist Dep't 1943);
Drivas v. Lekas, 265 App. Div. 1003, 39 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dep't 1943) (mem.), modified,
292 N.Y. 204, 54 N.E.2d 365 (1944).
77. See note 16 supra.
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to enable a director to propertly discharge his responsibilities, litigation
expenses should be paid by the corporation, whether or not it receives a
benefit, provided there is a reasonable basis for bringing the suit.
VII
DEFENSES7 8
Acquiescence of All Shareholders.-Acquiescence of all the stock-
holders of a corporation in acts of its directors which are designed to deprive
creditors of payment for their claims is not a defense to an action brought
by a director or officer under the statute. 9 It has been said that the director
has a duty to protect the rights of creditors.80
Unanimous acquiescence by the stockholders would, however, preclude
a suit by the corporation8l or any shareholder.82 The theory is that a share-
holder or the corporation should not be able to recover benefits which
would inure only to shareholders who participated in or ratified the wrong.
Furthermore, it seems that unanimous acquiescence would preclude a share-
holders' action even though creditors were involved. A shareholder does not
have a duty corresponding to a director's duty to protect creditors. The
rights of creditors, however, are not impaired by denial of a stockholders'
action, since creditors may sue the wrongdoers either for the benefit of the
corporation 83 or for their own benefit.84 Although authority is lacking, it
would seem that if no creditors were affected by the wrongful act and the
act were ratified by all the shareholders, a director's action under the statute
should be barred in order to prevent shareholders from recovering for wrongs
in which they participated.
Acquiescence by the Plaintiff-Director in the Wrongful Acts.-A plain-
78. The defense that plaintiff-director obtained his position through fraud, if
proved, destroys his position as director ab initio, thus requiring a dismissal of the sult.
Handler v. Belmare Lighting Co., 8 Misc. 2d 687, 168 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Although abatement and lack of standing to sue are defenses, they are discussed
separately in the text accompanying notes 94-115 because of their importance.
79. Halpin v. Mutual Brewing Co., 20 App. Div. 583, 47 N.Y. Supp. 412 (2d Dep't
1897).
80. Williams v. Robinson, 9 Misc. 2d 774, 775-76, 169 N.YS.2d 811, 813 (Sup. CL
1957), aff'd mem. sub nom. Levy v. Whipple, 5 App. Div. 2d 823, 170 N.YS.2d 991(lst Dep't 1958).
81. Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879); Capitol Wine & Spirit
Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Ist Dep't 1950), atf'd mem, 302
N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951).
82. Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954).
83. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60 (1943), § 61 (Supp. 1960). The word "creditor"
in § 61 has been construed to mean "judgment creditor." Belknap v. North America
Life Ins. Co., 11 Hun 282 (N.Y. 2d Dep't 1877); Kendall v. Oakland Golf Club, 123
N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct.), afw'd, 282 App. Div. 1057, 126 N.YS.2d 379 (2d Dep't 1953),
aff'd mem., 307 N.Y. 753, 121 N.E.2d 554 (1954).
84. Whalen v. Strong, 230 App. Div. 617, 246 N.Y. Supp. 40 (4th Dep't 1930) (im-
minently insolvent corporation); Buckley v. Stansfield, 155 App. Div. 735, 140 N.Y.
Supp. 953 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd mem., 214 N.Y. 679, 108 N.E. 1090 (1915) (insolvent
corporation).
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tiff-director will not be estopped from maintaining an action on the ground
that he ratified or acquiesced in the wrongs to the corporation.85 Since the
action is prosecuted on behalf of the corporation and not for the individual
plaintiff, his active or passive assent to the wrong will not condone the
wrong to the corporation. 6 It is not clear whether a shareholder is barred
from maintaining a derivative suit if he is one of several shareholders who
acquiesced in or ratified the act which gave rise to the Suit.8 7 Nevertheless,
the principle which may be advanced to bar an acquiescing shareholder has
no application to an acquiescing director. The shareholder, in instituting
suit, acts as a volunteer for the other shareholders, but the director acts in
fulfillment of his duty to protect the rights of the corporation.38
Statute of Limitations.-The limitations provided in Sections 48(8)
and 49(7) of the New York Civil Practice Act would appear applicable to
a director's statutory action brought on behalf of the corporation. Section
48(8) provides, in part, a six-year limitation for legal or equitable actions
by, or on behalf of, a corporation against a present or former director if the
action is (1) for an accounting, (2) to procure a judgment based on fraud
or (3) to enforce a common law or statutory liability. A three-year period
is applicable, however, if the action is to recover damages or to account for
waste or other injury to property.8 9 It has been held that when the complaint
alleges that defendant corporate fiduciaries have received money or an
equivalent bendfit and the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to make
them liable for money had and received, the tort may be waived and the
six-year period applied.9 0 In the absence of an allegation that the corporate
fiduciary benefited personally from the wrong, the theory of implied contract
is inapplicable and the three-year tort limitation governs.0 ' Normally the
statute begins to run from the time the wrong is committed.0 2 In an action
85. Levinson v. Rosoff (2d Dep't 1937), in 98 N.Y.L.J. 1927, col. 7; Wlliams v.
Robinson, 9 Misc. 2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd mere. sub noma.
Levy v. Whipple, 5 App. Div. 2d 823, 170 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1st Dep't 1958).
86. Williams v. Robinson, supra note 85.
87. Williams v. Robinson, 9 Misc. 2d 774, 776, 169 N.Y.S.2d 811, 814 (Sup. Ct.
1957) (dictum), aff'd mem. sub nom. Levy v. Whipple, 5 App. Div. 2d 823, 170 N.Y.S.2d
991 (1st Dep't 1958). That he may maintain the suit, see Goldberg v. Berry, 231 App.
Div. 165, 247 N.Y. Supp. 69 (1st Dep't 1930).
88. Williams v. Robinson, supra note 87, at 775, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
89. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 49(7). Gross v. Price, 128 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
modified mem., 284 App. Div. 964, 134 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1954), held that when
a shareholders' action has not been barred by the three- or six-year statute of limita-
tions, the defense of laches is not available. The defense of laches could be raised In a
director's statutory action before the statute of limitations had run. See Jacobus v.
Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App. Div. 366, 88 N.Y. Supp. 302 (1st Dep't 1904).
However, there seems to be no reason why the holding of the Gross case, supra, should
not be equally applicable to a director's action.
90. Myer v. Myer, 271 App. Div. 465, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dep't 1946), aff'd mor,,
296 N.Y. 979, 73 NXE.2d 562 (1947); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 50 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct.
1944), modified, 269 App. Div. 413, 56 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1st Dep't 1945).
91. Ross Indus. Corp. v. Bentley, 85 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
92. See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936).
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based on actual fraud, however, the limitation would seem to run from the
time of discovery.93
VIII
ABATEMENT
In Hamilton v. Gibson,94 plaintiff brought a director's statutory action
against his co-directors for mismanagement of corporate affairs. While the
action was pending, plaintiff failed of re-election at the annual meeting.
Defendants' motion to vacate an order requiring a pre-trial examination on
the ground that the action had abated was denied. The appellate division,
reversing, held that the action under the statute had abated. The court
reasoned as follows:
It is a director, in virtue of his office, that the statute authorizes to sue, not
the individual who holds the office. It seems to follow that when the plaintiff
ceased to be a director, and thereby lost the only qualification to sue v'hich
he ever possessed, the action must have abated, since the plaintiff, to wit,
C. E. Hamilton as director, had ceased to exist.... When he ceases to be a
director.. his cause of action cannot survive.0 5
However, in Manix v. Fantl,90 the appellate division reversed its posi-
tion. The court recognized that the basis of the Hamilton decision was that
the cause of action under the statute was personal to the director and dis-
tinct from that of the corporation for the same acts of misconduct. The
court in Manix stated that the statute did not create a new cause of action
but merely qualified a director and certain other persons to enforce an
existing cause of action.97 Since the cause of action belongs to the corpora-
tion and is brought for its benefit, the action survives the director's loss of
office during the pendency of the action.98 If the action did not survive loss
of office, the defendant directors could in many cases frustrate the purpose
of the statute by legally ousting" the plaintiff from office or preventing his
re-election. 00
93. Myer v. Myer, 271 App. Div. 465, 475-76, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83, 93 (1st Dep't 1946)
(dictum), aff'd mem., 269 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562 (1947).
94. 145 App. Div. 825, 130 N.Y. Supp. 684 (1st Dep't 1911).
95. Id. at 827, 130 N.Y. Supp. at 685-86. N.Y. Code Civ. Proced. § 755 (Banks &
Bros. 1904) (now N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 82) provided that "an action does not
abate by any event, if the cause of action survives or continues." Finding that the
cause of action did not survive, the court held that the action had abated. 145 App.
Div. at 828, 130 N.Y. Supp. at 686.
96. 209 App. Div. 756, 205 N.Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1924).
97. Id. at 759, 205 N.Y. Supp. at 176. That the statute did not create a new cause
of action, see People v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 124 App. Div.
714, 109 N.Y. Supp. 453 (1st Dep't 1908).
98. 209 App. Div. at 758, 205 N.Y. Supp. at 176.
99. An illegal ouster would have no effect on plaintiff's right to continue the suit.
Wyckoff v. Sagafl, 16 Misc. 2d 630, 56 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. CL 1945); Wangrow v.
Wangrow, 211 App. Div. 552, 557-58, 207 N.Y. Supp. 132, 137 (Ist Dep't 1924) (dictum
reaffirming Manix).
100. This consequence would not have justified a holding that the action did not
abate if the court had held that the cause of action was personal to the director. S~e
note 95 supra. On the other hand, once the court decided that the cause of action be-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 36 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 211 1961
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
On the strength of Manix, the court in Abberger v. Klp01 refused to
grant an injunction to restrain the removal of the plaintiff while the action
was pending. The plaintiff had contended that an injunction was necessary
since his removal from office would cause the action to abate. In Kehaya v.
Axton,10 2 however, a federal district court declared that it would not follow
the Manix case, noting that the court of appeals had not dealt with the
question of abatement in this context.
It is submitted, however, that the holdings of the Manix and Kehaya
cases are not in conflict. Although Kehaya contains some criticism of
Manix, Kehaya did not pass on the question of abatement. It held only that
the plaintiff, upon loss of office, had no standing to continue the action.103
Manix, on the other hand, held that the action does not abate, but did not
pass on the issue of standing since it was not presented in the motion to
dismiss.
Uncertainty was finally removed in Tenney v. Rosenthal,10 4 in which
the court of appeals held that the action did not abate because in the statu-
tory action the director sues for the benefit of the corporation and not to
enforce a personal right. The court distinguished a director's right under
sections 60 and 61 from his absolute right of inspection, which is personal
to him and terminates when he loses office.105
Ix
STANDING TO SUE
When a director loses his office in the course of an action, two distinct
questions, one of abatement and one of capacity to sue, are presented. Both
questions must be resolved in the director's favor in order to enable him to
continue the litigation.
Although the holding in Hamilton v. Gibson,100 was that the action
longed to the corporation, it was logically compelled to hold that the cause of action
survived the plaintiff's ouster and that the action did not abate. Furthermore, in order to
avoid frustration of the statute, a court would be justified in holding that the plaintiff
maintained his standing to continue the suit although he no longer was a director.
E.g., Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 213-14, 160 N.E.2d 463, 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158,
165 (1959). The Manix case did not pass on the question of plaintiff's standing.
101. 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y. Supp. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
102. 32 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
103. "The question here is the loss of status and naught else." 32 F. Supp. at 269.
"To hold that if a director, who has sued, loses his status as director further maintenance
of the suit by him is barred, does not mean that the cause of action, if there is one,
has disappeared." Id. at 268-69. But see Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 208-09,
160 N.E.2d 463, 465, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (1959), where the court cites Kehaya as
contrary to Manix and other similar holdings.
104. 6 N.Y.2d 204, 160 N.E.2d 463, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1959).
105. Id. at 209, 160 N.E.2d at 465, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 161. The absolute right to
inspect is lost when a director ceases to hold office and only a qualified right exist.
Cohen v. Cocoline Prods., Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127 N.E.2d 906 (1955).
106. 145 App. Div. 825, 130 N.Y. Supp. 684 (1st Dep't 1911). The holding of this
case that the action abated upon plaintiff's loss of office was, in effect, overruled by
Manix v. Fantl, 209 App. Div. 756, 205 N.Y. Supp. 174 (Ist Dep't 1924). See discussion
in text at notes 94-98 supra.
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abated upon the plaintiff's loss of office, nonetheless, the court in dictum
touched briefly on the problem of standing. It stated that "when he [the
plaintiff] ceases to be a director his right to maintain the action as such
ceases. Thereafter he has no standing to prosecute it."10 7 In Manix v.
Fantl,10 8 there is dictum to the effect that, although the right to bring the
action attaches to the office of director, the right to continue the action does
not necessarily depend upon the continuance in office of the director. The
first case to pass on the question was Kehaya v. Axton,100 which held that
an ousted director had no capacity to maintain the suit as he no longer
represented the corporation. The ousted director's relationship to the cor-
poration could only be that of a self-appointed master of the suit without
present or potential interest in the litigation.110 This situation, said the
court, invites irresponsibility. Thus, prior to 1959, there were no state court
holdings on the problem of a plaintiff-director's standing to continue suit
and the only decision in point was that of the federal district court in
Kekaya.
In Tenney v. Rosenthal,1 1 the court of appeals resolved the issue of
standing to sue in favor of the ousted plaintiff-director. Judge Fuld, speak-
ing for the court, analogized the ousted director to a guardian ad litem. He
rejected any comparison to a shareholders' derivative suit,'-- in which a
shareholder-plaintiff is automatically disqualified from continuing the action
when he sells all his stock.'13 The fiduciary duty of a director as guardian
ad litem of the corporation is distinct from the duty which he had prior
to instituting the suit. It remains unaffected "by the fact that he is a
stranger to his ward."'-14 This ensures the enforcement of the corporation's
cause of action once the suit has been properly commenced notwithstanding
the plaintiff's loss of status. The protection afforded extends not only to
107. 145 App. Div. at 827, 130 N.Y. Supp. at 686.
108. 209 App. Div. 756, 759, 205 N.Y. Supp. 174, 176 (Ist Dep't 1924) (dictum).
109. 32 F. Supp. 266 (S-D-N.Y. 1940).
110. This is not true if the director is also a shareholder. Unless the certificate of
incorporation or the by-laws provide otherwise, the director must be a shareholder.
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 55 (1951).
111. 6 N.Y.2d 204, 160 N.E.2d 463, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1959).
112. Three reasons were advanced why the rule of automatic disqualification should
not apply to a director's action when the plaintiff ceases to hold office. (1) The direc-
tor's action is based on his fiduciary duty to the corporation, while the shareholders'
derivative suit is based on the shareholders' proprietary interest which is lost when he
sells the stock. (2) A shareholder in disposing of his stock impliedly abandons the
corporation's cause of action. No such inference may be drawn, however, when a direc-
tor fails to be re-elected, as the director may have been ousted by those who are opposed
to the curbing of the abuses upon which the suit is based. (3) The rule is one among
several worked out by the courts to avoid potential abuses in derivative suits. The
same end is sought by N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 61, 61-b (Supp. 1960), i.e., enforcement
of the corporate cause of action by the method least subject to abuse. Thus, absent a
legislative direction, the court felt it should not extend the rule to a director. 6 N.Y.2d
at 210-13, 160 N.E.2d at 466-68, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 163-65.
113. See Gleicher v. Times-Columbia Distribs., Inc., 283 App. Div. 709, 128 N.YS.
2d 55 (1st Dep't 1954) (per curiam).
114. 6 N.Y.2d at 211-12, 160 N.E.2d at 467, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
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cases in which a director is defeated for re-election but also to those in which
a director, in violation of his obligation, is induced to resign. The court
stated, however, that the corporation could take control of the litigation upon
a showing that its board of directors was in no way connected with the
alleged wrongs."n
X
EFFECT OF SECTION 61 ON SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS
Institution of Derivative Suit After Commencement of Director's Ac-
tion.-The commencement of a director's action will not bar a shareholder
from instituting a derivative suit to compel an accounting for the same acts
of managerial abuse even though one of the plaintiffs in the derivative action
is the director.1l6 The two suits are different in origin, the shareholders'
action being equitable in nature, the director's statutory.""1 Moreover, it
has been stated that a shareholder has no control over the director's action,
and it may be discontinued without regard to his rights.118 However, double
expense on the defendants' part should be avoided by staying the share-
holders' suit until final determination of the director's action.
Jury Trial.-A derivative action by a stockholder is equitable in char-
acter. Therefore, no general right to a jury trial exists.'" The contention
that section 61 by implication entitled either party in a shareholders'
action 20 to apply for a jury trial on issues of negligence was rejected in
115. Id. at 210, 160 N.E.2d at 466, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 162. The plaintiff could also
be disqualified for conflict of interest.
116. Lowenstein v. Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App. Div. 383, 88 N.Y. Supp,
313 (1st Dep't 1904).
117. See notes 6 and 14 supra and accompanying text.
118. This was stated in Lowenstein v. Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App.
Div. 383, 385, 88 N.Y. Supp. 313, 315, (1st Dep't 1904) (dictum). It is submitted,
however, that the rights of the shareholder would be protected although he has no con-
trol over the director's action. The plaintiff-director's position in the suit is equivalent
to that of a guardian ad litem. Consequently, he should not be able to discontinuo
the action without first obtaining judicial approval. Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621,
154 Pac. 312 (1915). Although the Whitten case is a shareholder's derivative suit, the
court of appeals cited it when applying the guardian ad litem analogy in Tenney v.
Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 209, 160 N.E.2d 463, 464-65, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (1959).
In New York, a shareholder can discontinue a derivative suit at any time prior to
final judgment. Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.Y.S.2d
502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd mem., 262 App. Div. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1st Dep't 1941),
aff'd mem., 288 N.Y. 668, 43 N.E.2d 71 (1942). However, the shareholder holds any
settlement fund he receives as trustee for the corporation. Clarke v. Greenberg, 296
N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947). The rule of discontinuance in the case of a share-
holder is further alleviated by allowing shareholders who have no knowledge of the
pending action to institute a separate one. Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp.,
240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360 (2d Dep't 1934). Moreover, a discontinuance
will not bar a later action by another shareholder. Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Hopson, supra at 226, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 508 (dictum). Of course, a later suit will be
barred if the statute of limitations has run. This is one of the evils of allowing a share-
holder to discontinue the suit at any time prior to final judgment.
119. Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 105 N.Y. 567, 12 N.E. 58 (1887).
120. A shareholder's derivative action is not within N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60
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Bookbinder v. Chase Nat'l Bank.' 1 The court stated that if the legislature
had intended to extend the right of jury trial to actions other than those
brought pursuant to sections 60 and 61 it would have expressly done so. -
XI
EFIrECT OF SECTION 61 ON PRESIDENT'S IMPLIED POWER To INSrruTE SuIT
In West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.,"-s the president, who
was also a director and shareholder, instituted suit in the name of the cor-
poration against a majority of the board of directors for a violation of their
fiduciary duties. The court of appeals held that, absent a provision in the
by-laws or a prohibition from the board, the president has presumptive
authority to institute action in the name of the corporation to protect and
preserve its interests, even though he is, in effect, suing a majority of the
board- 2 4 Judge Froessel, in a vigorous dissent, stated that the majority
opinion exalted form over substance since there can never be implied or
presumptive authority when the president has actual knowledge that a
majority of the directors oppose the suit.- 5 He stated that the proper remedy
in this situation is a shareholders' derivative suit.'"
The problem of the president's implied power to institute suit in the
name of the corporation can easily be avoided by bringing an action under
section 61, which permits officers as well as directors to institute suit against
other officers or directors for acts of misconduct.- 7 The continuance of the
suit would be safeguarded by the rule of Tenney v. Rosenthal s8 which
would seem equally applicable to an officer who also serves in a fiduciary
capacity. 29 Despite this solution, the problem may be kept alive by the
question of reimbursement in an unsuccessful action brought under section
61.30 No case has decided who must bear the litigation expenses in such
an action. If the officer or director who brings suit under section 61 must
(1943), § 61 (Supp. 1960). Gans v. Hearst, 173 ifisc. 662, 17 N.Y.S2d 834 (Sup. CL
1939), aff'd mem., 259 App. Div. 861, 20 N.YS.2d 400 (1st Dep't 1940).
121. 244 App. Div. 650, 280 N.Y. Supp. 393 (1st Dept 1935).
122. Id. at 652, 280 N.Y. Supp. at 395.
123. 6 N.Y.2d 344, 160 N.E.2d 622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959), 1959 Survey of N.Y.
Law, 34 N.Y.U.IL. Rev. 1432-33.
124. 6 N.Y.2d at 348, 160 N.E.2d at 625, 189 N.YS.2d at 866.
125. Id. at 349-50, 160 N.E.2d at 625, 189 N.YS.2d at 867 (dissenting opinion).
See also Tidy-House Paper Corp. v. Adlman, 4 App. Div. 2d 619, 168 N.YS.2d 448
(lst Dep't 1957).
126. 6 N.Y.2d at 350, 160 N.E.2d at 626, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (dissenting opinion).
See Schulman v. Adlman, 191 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. CL 1959).
127. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60 (1943), § 61 (Supp. 1960).
128. 6 N.Y.2d 204, 160 N.E.2d 463, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1959).
129. This is a necessary result in the case of a president, since he must be chosen
from among the directors. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 60 (1951). But se Study Bill,
S. 3316, art. 7, § 23 (Feb. 15, 1960).
130. On the question of reimbursement, see text at note 76 supra. Even if reimburse.
ment were allowed, the amount of the initial outlay to commence and maintain the
suit may cause the president to sue in the name of the corporation rather than under
section 61.
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pay the expenses when the corporation receives no benefit, a president
would be inclined to bring suit on the principle of West View Hills, in which
case the corporation would bear all expenses. Even if the plaintiff in an
unsuccessful section 61 action did not have to pay litigation expenses, the
problem of the president's implied authority to sue in the corporate name
would remain important in actions against outsiders, as section 61 applies
only to actions against officers and directors of the corporation.181
XII
CONCLUSION
From the preceding discussion it can be seen that the director's action
has several advantages over a shareholders' derivative suit.
1. Demand on the board of directors is necessary as a condition prece-
dent to the institution of a shareholders' derivative action.132 Furthermore,
when the wrong is subject to shareholder ratification, a demand on the
shareholders is also required. 18 3 The requirement of demand does not apply
to a director's statutory action.13 4
2. A shargholder must have owned his stock at the time of the wrong
* of which he complains.13 5 The director need not have been a director at
the time the cause of action arose.130
3. The security-for-expense requirement is a serious obstacle to a
shareholders' action 37 but has no application to a suit brought by a director
under section 61.138
4. An unsuccessful shareholder cannot be reimbursed for his litigation
expenses. 130 The rule may be otherwise in a director's action.140
5. Acquiescence by the plaintiff-shareholder in the wrong of which
he complains may estop him from bringing suit.14 1 Acquiescence by a
plaintiff-director is no defense to an action under section 61.142
6. Loss of stock by a shareholder maintaining a derivative action will
automatically terminate his standing to continue the suit.143 However, loss
131. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60 (1943) specifies the persons against whom a § 61
action may be brought. The issue would be important in cases similar to Matter of
Arbitration between Paloma Frocks, Inc. and Shamokin Sportswear Corp., 3 N.Y.2d
572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958), and Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing
Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
132. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 21 supra.
134. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
136. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
137. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32
Calif. L. Rev. 123 (1944); Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control, 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 476 (1950). See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
139. See cases cited in note 76 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
141. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
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of office by the plaintiff-director while the suit is pending will not affect the
director's standing to continue prosecuting the action.1 44
7. A shareholder has complete control over the conduct of the litigation
in a derivative suit. It may be, however, that a director cannot arbitrarily
discontinue his action.145
8. A director is likely to be better informed as to acts of misconduct.
He is thus better qualified to conduct the litigation.
Although a director's statutory action has been authorized since 1828,140
case law on the subject is remarkably limited. This proceeding can be
particularly valuable in enforcing the fiduciary duties of management in
corporations in which there is a minority representation on the board of
directors.14 7 It is submitted that New York would benefit from increased
use of the director's action and that other jurisdictions would profit by its
adoption.
GILBERT M. GOLDIXN
SIDNEY A. K, ESTEL
144. See notes 111-15 supra and accompanying text.
145. See note 118 supra.
146. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1828, ch. 20, § 3 (codified in 2 Rev. Stat. pt. 3, ch. 8, tit. 4,
§§ 33, 35 (1829)].
147. A director's suit will probably be brought by a minority faction on the board
since a majority of the board could cause the corporation to bring suit and thus avoid
any uncertainty as to the expenses of the suit. See text at note 76 supra. In a public
issue corporation, a director who does not control sufficient votes to ensure his re-
election may be deterred from instituting suit by the knowledge that the majority may
use proxies to defeat him. This problem will be even more acute in a closely held cor-
poration, in which the majority of the board are probably majority stockholders.
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